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abstract
‘Silicon utopias’, the hope for a green, affluent and happy future through 
the creation of new tech-businesses, are today informing many urban 
development processes globally. In this contribution, I look at the recent 
remodeling of Manchester (Northern England) as an entrepreneurial city. 
In particular, I present a specific government investment scheme and its 
relation to the work of a group of local lobbyists who have been promoting 
a new tech startup community in the city since 2012. Stemming from this 
empirical example, I explore the interplay between local entrepreneurial 
dreams and the state’s promotion of startups. The paper concludes with 
the argument that an anthropologically informed concept of cynicism can 
contribute to a nuanced reading of silicon utopias and dystopias. 
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INTROdUCTION1
In an information society, no thought, 
debate or dream is wasted—whether 
conceived in a tent camp, prison cell or the 
table football space of a startup company. 
‘The end of capitalism has begun’, by Paul 
Mason in The Guardian (2015)
It was at the table football in a co-workspace 
in Manchester (Northwest England) where 
I was reading a very similar slogan written 
on the wall while waiting for the CEO of 
a technology startup company to finish his 
game for our interview. The prophetic title and 
the oracular words of the BBC journalist Paul 
Mason fit the category of utopias of human 
liberation through technology; utopias which 
are periodically updated through whatever 
is a ‘new’ technology in any given moment 
(Harvey 1996: 127). Tech(nology), not only 
in the journalistic domain, is today writ large 
with software, computer-sustained electronic 
devices, internet and a selected number of 
related omnipresent global corporations, brands 
and algorithm-sustained products and services 
which have become ubiquitous in everyday 
life. Nevertheless, Mason’s reference to the 
prison cell or the tent camp also indicates 
the association of technology startups with 
transgression of the status quo. Besides, labels 
such as the information society suggest a specific 
kind of symbiosis between technology and 
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culture as a distinctive feature of this moment in 
history. Far from being exclusively journalistic 
jargon, academia, corporations, the art world 
and politicians employ quite similar vocabulary 
as Mason and similar self-descriptions of tech 
startup companies do exist in everyday practice, 
as this contribution will show. How is it, one 
might ask, that business creation, when related 
to digital technology, is seen today as a way to 
get rich, overcome climate change or promote 
happiness?
The following research report is divided 
into four main sections. The first section looks 
at the origins of these pervasive ‘silicon utopias’. 
It explores the imaginations and concepts 
related to the ‘digital age’ in art, academia and 
in the first ethnographic accounts of computer 
technology communities published at the turn 
of the century. The second section analyses 
the political economy of the recent restyling 
of Manchester as a digital-technological city. 
In the third section, I present the case of a 
specific development project supported by the 
central government and articulated by local 
leaders of the tech-community. The final section 
relates this case study to concepts such as the 
entrepreneurial dream. An anthropologically 
informed notion of cynicism, I suggest in the 
conclusions, can contribute to a balanced 
evaluation of the contemporary ideology of 
technological entrepreneurialism beyond 
the utopias of practitioners and dystopias of 
academics. 
UTOPIAS ANd 
ETHNOGRAPHIES  
OF TECHNOLOGICALLY 
SATURATEd COMMUNITIES
The apparently ever-growing importance of 
information and communication technology 
in everyday life shapes contemporary 
representations of society and the economy. 
Tropes such as ‘the sharing economy’, ‘creative 
industries’ or ‘the information society’ envision 
present and future worlds, resultant from 
computer based technologies, in academic 
writing, technology businesses and ordinary 
experience. Anthropologists have rephrased 
Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ (2001 
[1983]), to call some of these representations 
‘imagined networks’ (Green et al. 2005: 806) 
or ‘imagined worlds’ (Appadurai 1996: 33). 
Subsequently, for anthropology a whole 
series of new intriguing questions have arisen. 
Technology itself is increasingly displayed as 
‘culture’ in its own right, not only as enabling, 
improving or assisting culture (Harvey 1996: 
121–123). New exotic communities emerge, 
such as digital natives, hackers, freaks, techies, 
nerds, gamers or geeks (Tocci 2009) and online 
communities seem to question place-based 
ethnography (Whitehead and Wesch 2012). 
Among the origins of fantasies of the 
digital or information age was the work of 
Marshall McLuhan.2 The Medium is the Message 
(2008 [1967]), a book at the intersections of 
philosophy, cultural studies and pop-art, includes 
some of his most popular ideas. Communication 
technology is shaping the mentality of societies 
as we move towards a world of total involvement, 
the global village, one of the popular terms he 
has coined. ‘Electric circuitry is recreating in 
us the multi-dimensional space orientation of 
the “primitive”’; it ‘confers a mythic dimension 
on our ordinary individual and group actions’ 
and it is ‘orientalizing the west’ (McLuhan and 
Fiore 1967: 57, 114, 145). Today McLuhan-
influenced scholars relate this ‘new tribalism’ 
to internet communities (Stille  2000) and 
anthropologists have referred to McLuhan’s 
‘global village’ as part of the history of the 
globalization concept (Eriksen 2007: 2). In 
addition, there have been recent anthropological 
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narratives similar to McLuhan’s, in form 
(presented as philosophic artwork), popularity 
(reaching out to a wide general public) and 
content (technology is changing our mentality). 
Michael Wesch, professor of anthropology, 
is author of the artistic video collage, ‘The 
Machine is Us/ing Us’, arguing that the internet 
leads to more sharing, trading, collaboration and 
is reconfiguring identities and self-perceptions. 
It was the most popular video on the Web in 
October 2007 and up to 2015 it had been 
viewed over eleven million times. The prophetic 
nature of these accounts has similar correlates in 
corporate narratives of revolutionary products, 
such as the iPad (everything changes with iPad), 
Skype (keeps the world talking) or Facebook 
(it’s free and always will be). Of course, the 
very nature of utopias is that they are entangled 
with dystopias. ‘Don’t be evil,’ was Google’s 
much discussed corporate slogan until recently, 
while the first Macintosh commercial in 1984 
played with Orwell’s dystopian novel, ‘Nineteen 
Eighty-Four’.
At the turn of the century two books, by 
Paulina Borsook (2000) and Jan English-
Lueck (2002) respectively, were published on 
the cultural particularities of a community that 
was seen as the showcase of the ‘information 
revolution’ and the ‘emerging global culture’ 
(English-Lueck 2002: 8). They analyzed the 
values and worldviews of the Silicon Valley 
tech or startup community, a group structured 
by the symbolic and economic power of the 
cutting edge technology they themselves 
created.3 Both authors knew about each other 
while writing their books. Borsook depicted a 
telephone conversation with English-Lueck 
as amusing, because ‘to these anthropologists, 
what I was describing was the religion of 
their native informants’ (2001: 4–5). Inversely, 
English-Lueck referred to Borsook’s work in a 
footnote, misspelling her name as Barsook, as 
‘more journalistic’ (2002: 9). Both Borsook`s 
self-titled ‘gonzo anthropology’ (2001: 3) and 
English-Lueck’s in-depth ethnography were 
innovative for their time, considering that 
Google, founded in 1998 and moving to Palo 
Alto in 1999, was not even mentioned yet by 
English-Lueck. Both looked at the cultural 
consequences of the new computer technology 
not only for consumers, but for their producers, 
studying, through participant observation, the 
local particularities of a community shaped 
by ‘technological saturation’ (English-Lueck 
2002). Borsook created a powerful dystopia 
of Northern California’s ‘technolibertarian’ 
community which she, fifteen years after her 
publication, describes in a contribution for the 
blog of the Institute of Network Cultures of the 
Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences as 
‘so.much.worse.now’: 
Silicon Valley is both (as has always been 
the case) in bed with and in opposition to 
government. The language of ‘disruption’ 
and ‘sharing economy’ seems more about 
avoiding taxes, licenses, and corporate 
liability than ‘sharing’ anything (i.e. deeply 
technolibertarian)—but then the terms 
Friend ™ and Like ™ have also taken on 
strange new meanings. (2015)
The ethos that English-Lueck identifies in the 
Bay Area of the 1990s is similar, but the more 
cultural-relativistic style of the monograph 
did not allow for such accentuated political 
positioning. Instrumental reasoning prevailed 
(life is managed), ‘the production of technology 
[was] a moral mission’ (technoptimism) and 
people lived for their work as they felt joy 
and passion for technology or ‘technolust’ 
(2002: 34–35, 42, 51, 95, 174). In 2015, these 
descriptions feel mundane and familiar as 
our everyday experience is intimately related 
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with ever-present mobile devices (ubiquitous 
computing is the technical term used by 
software engineers today). The author rightly 
anticipated the predictive character of her 
findings in the Silicon Valley laboratory. 
Today, administrations and corporations 
are trying to reproduce these ‘silicon commu-
nities’ or ‘places’ (English-Lueck 2002: 11, 166, 
181). In this endeavor, more intriguing than 
the question of what digital-tech communities 
ontologically are, is how they are envisioned as 
desirable futures by politicians, city planners 
and lobbyists. ‘[A]ll the world wants to be what 
it thinks Silicon Valley is like’ (Borsook 2001: 
8; my italics). Along these lines, the entrepre-
neurial ideal underlying urban redevelopment in 
Manchester has received considerable attention 
from academics in recent years. 
MANCHESTER:  
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL CITY
Greater Manchester, the third largest 
metropolitan area in the UK, was once the 
epicenter of the industrial revolution, especially 
in terms of the textile industry. As with 
Silicon Valley today, places and products were 
labelled ‘Manchester’ because of the worldwide 
diffusion of the city’s cotton products, which led 
historian Harold James to a comparison with 
the contemporary iconicity of the McDonalds 
hamburger (2001: 12).4 Since the 1930s, the city 
has experienced a process of urban decline and 
deindustrialization. From the 1970s onwards 
and especially after an IRA bomb explosion 
in the city center in 1996, the city has been 
‘regenerated’ by city planners, administrations 
and corporations, mainly through public-private 
partnerships (Hetherington 2007: 630–631).
Urban studies have, since the 1990s, 
experienced what some have called an 
‘entrepreneurial turn’ (Ward 2003: 116), and 
authors like the English geographer David 
Harvey have prominently argued that the 
basic functions of city governance have shifted 
from redistribution to inter-urban competition. 
The ‘business’ of public administrations today 
is attracting external sources of funding, in 
Manchester as in other cities within advanced 
capitalist societies (1989: 4, 7, 9). In this 
direction, recent redevelopments in the central 
and eastern districts of Manchester, or the 
bid for the 2000 Olympic Games, have been 
described as an accommodation between the 
city’s authorities and the local and global 
private sector (Quilley 1999; 2000; Ward 
2003; Hetherington 2007). ‘Manchester has 
been positioned (and perhaps cast itself ) as 
the entrepreneurial city writ large’ (Ward 2003: 
124–125). But it has also been argued that the 
new entrepreneurial governance has required 
more not less state intervention (Ward 2003: 
117) and forced the traditionally socialist city 
council into arrangements with the neoliberal 
agendas of governments at Westminster, either 
Tory or New Labor (Quilley 1999: 187). These 
arguments were again compatible with Harvey’s 
framework of cities’ growing competition 
for redistribution funds from the central 
government (Harvey 1989: 10).
A particularly compelling ethnographic 
account has been produced by Green, Harvey 
and Knox (2005) related to a third layer 
of entanglement between local elites in 
Manchester and powerful institutions seeking 
to redefine urban spaces and communities 
through investment in technology. They were 
reporting on European Union funded projects 
during the 1990s and early 2000s aiming to 
develop computer-supported networks among 
European cities’ administrations, foster the 
‘digitalization’ of museums or support the 
consolidation of Manchester’s new-media 
industry (Knox 2003). The moral underpinning 
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of these public investment schemes, that the 
authors have labelled ‘the imperative to connect’, 
consisted in nurturing a sense of belonging to a 
new (virtual) Europe that would be compatible 
with existing identifications of nationhood 
and local place (Green et al. 2005: 817). New 
information and communication technologies, 
like railways or television before them, were 
used for place-making, these being the social 
processes of generation and control of space, its 
meaning, boundaries and symbols (Green et al. 
2005: 805–806).
This political-economic process is currently 
being reshaped in the United Kingdom. 
The central government’s reaction to the 
intensification of the Scottish independence 
movement since 2014 has been a new attempt 
to ‘devolve powers’ to all regions of the kingdom. 
Metropolitan areas in the north of England, 
such as Manchester, inferior to the south in 
growth, population and infrastructure, have 
also been promised new self-governance 
and investments by the conservative British 
government re-elected in 2015. This wider 
political agenda, promoted with the slogan 
‘Northern Powerhouse’, was accompanied by 
public and private investments in the field of 
the digital industries, which take advantage of 
the general favorable political climate, as my 
following example illustrates. 
MAKING A TECH STARTUP 
ECOSYSTEM IN MANCHESTER
The Tech City UK initiative, started in 2010 
by the conservative-liberal British government, 
consisted of a series of investments (broadband), 
deregulations (entrepreneur visa, review of 
intellectual property laws) and public-private 
partnerships (research eventually supported by 
corporations such as Google and Facebook), to 
promote the East London technology cluster. 
It was to help shorten the distance between 
Silicon Valley and East London, also referred 
to as ‘Silicon Roundabout’ (see for instance 
debates in The Guardian [Wintour and Travis 
2010]). In 2012, inspired by the mapping of 
tech-businesses in London realized by Tech 
City, two Manchester-based entrepreneurs had 
the idea of gathering novel, qualitative, first-
hand information and analysis of so called ‘tech 
communities’, existing outside London. The 
following description of different but related 
initiatives launched by media experts, bank 
consultants and software engineers since 2012, 
draws from observations, interviews and social-
media-text analysis I have realized during two 
months of fieldwork in summer 2015.
Among the first steps in the making of 
a Manchester tech startup community was the 
collection and display of statistical data that 
justified speaking of a startup-community in the 
first place. After a group of entrepreneurs had 
interviewed prominent or successful founders of 
tech businesses in different cities in the UK, they 
started to create the profile of a ‘Manchester 
tech community’. Several web presentations 
have been set up, showing statistics on growth, 
employment, types of startups, but especially 
the different components of the ‘ecosystem’ such 
as the identification of research institutes or 
bars frequented by techies. This was combined 
with an increase in social media-disseminated 
narratives of success stories of particular 
enterprises, events and entrepreneurs. Hence, in 
order to visualize the existence of a tech startup 
community, it had to be pictured, mapped, 
measured and named, mainly because it is 
an industry that is ill-defined and constantly 
changing, as observed by Knox of Manchester’s 
‘creative industry’ (2003: 155–156). More specific 
social media campaigns followed, such as a 
slogan that promoted the idea of Manchester 
as an imminent top-five European tech-city. 
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In a second step, these lobbyists created a 
physical and social infrastructure that allowed 
for the possibility of first-hand and face-to-
face experiences of a local tech community 
‘offline’. For this goal, several co-workspaces and 
periodic networking events have been created 
and promoted. 
Then, in a third step, all these activities 
attracted the attention of those in charge 
of Tech City UK. In 2013, two young men 
involved in the promotion of the Manchester 
startup community were invited to advise the 
governmental Tech City UK managers that 
brought together various ‘leading figures from 
thriving digital clusters’ (Tech City UK 2015). 
The new ‘Cluster Alliance’ also attempted to 
expand Tech City activities to support the 
rest of the ‘Tech Nation’ and its ‘clusters’ and 
‘communities’ (the Prime Minister’s words in 
this report). As a result of this, in 2015 the 
creation of ‘Tech North’ was announced and 
the government committed to an investment of 
£11 million in tech incubators in three cities in 
northern England, £4 million of this to fund the 
proposal presented by one of these entrepreneurs. 
In addition, this social-media and public 
relations expert eventually raised another £20 
million from private investors, as he and others 
told me. The investment from the government 
was justified in the budget with reference to the 
Tech Nation report, which ‘revealed’ the large 
growth numbers and important employment 
rates of digital businesses in the north of 
England. 
The success story of this and other lobbyists 
was celebrated on Twitter and LinkedIn or 
specialized online forums, magazines or local 
media, showcasing some of the main elements 
of success, such as the mapping of startup 
communities outside London, the provision of 
consulting services to the government and the 
amount of money raised. In fact, this particular 
media-expert was portrayed as a ‘rising star’ 
by a British computer magazine and the story 
was echoed in various conversations and public 
presentations at events directed at Manchester 
tech entrepreneurs I visited on a daily basis 
during my fieldwork. The names of key persons, 
the amounts of private and public money that 
had been ‘raised’ and the general excitement 
about ‘what’s going on’ has been at the core of 
these tales. 
GOvERNMENT SUbSIdY 
ANd THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
dREAM
This specific way in which the physical, 
social and visual infrastructure of a ‘startup 
ecosystem’ has been set up in Manchester 
since 2012, especially by a small group of 
young entrepreneurs and media experts (which 
finally attracted the attention of the state 
administration) fits in well with the four basic 
patterns of the entrepreneurial dream identified 
by Gill (2013). The entrepreneurial dream is 
a narrative that was essential to US business 
periodicals’ display of entrepreneurs throughout 
the 2000s. First, in these tales there was an origin 
story of difficulty. In our case from Manchester, 
one of the important figures in the making of 
this startup community portrayed himself as 
coming from a working class background and 
his way to success was hampered by economic 
hardship. Secondly, there was a unique idea 
from an ordinary person. In our case, it was the 
expansion of the Tech City initiative in London 
to other parts of the UK. The third momentum 
of the entrepreneurial dream that Gill mentions, 
namely innovation through technology, was 
realized by our entrepreneurs through the 
picturing and identifying of tech clusters 
outside London through social media, statistics 
and web presentations. Finally, masculine 
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qualities of strength and adventurousness were 
not only embodied by many of these young men, 
often described in conversations with people at 
technology events as ‘leaders’, but also by the 
stories they disseminated, such as a backpacking 
trip across Britain in order to gather the data for 
the previously mentioned innovative report on 
tech-clusters outside London. 
From the local perspective and in 
conversations at tech events in Manchester, it 
was the entrepreneurial dream coming true 
that finally attracted government investment 
and bureaucratic support like Tech North 
initiative. Nevertheless, besides the individual 
capacities of the lobbyists in working for ‘their 
community’ (or ‘talent’ in the rhetoric of startup 
communities) and the element of coincidence 
(both core momentums of the entrepreneurial 
dream), the government investment also had 
structural explanations. In Latour’s terms 
(2005) these ‘tech-community leaders’ were 
(agentive) mediators from the local perspective, 
but were intermediaries when looking at the 
wider political landscape of the UK of 2015, as 
I argue in the following. 
On the one hand, the specific public-private 
partnership expressed by the collaboration 
between Tech North and local lobbyists could 
successfully tackle a basic contradiction of the 
administrative promotion of entrepreneurship. 
State interference in startups, creativity, 
competition or innovation is an incongruity in 
its own terms, which administrations seek to 
disperse. This becomes evident when looking 
at the Tech City UK’s web self-presentation 
as a ‘publicly, funded non-profit team with 
a private sector mentality’. This integration of 
the private sector mentality in public policy, 
normally practiced through partnership with 
large corporations, as we have seen in the 
discussion of the entrepreneurial city at the 
beginning of this section, has a second problem 
when applied to startup promotion. At the heart 
of the entrepreneurship concept is an imagined 
local agency or individual of the kind Gill 
(2013) has described and which individual tech-
community promoters represent, not a faceless 
multi-national corporation. From this angle, 
the entrepreneur is a contemporary metaphor 
of the local within the economic dimension 
of globalization (Pfeilstetter 2014). In this 
sense, the Google Innovation Hub or Facebook 
Developer Garage, as part of the London Tech 
City initiative, could be criticized as a ‘corporate, 
top-down’ policy that allows US corporations 
to ‘cherry-pick’ promising British startups while 
paying tax in Ireland (see PDA 2010).5 Thus, 
this kind of private engagement undercuts the 
possibility of the formation of an archetype 
entrepreneur (like Steve Jobs) in the UK, which 
was the justification of public investment in 
the first place. Therefore, the narrative that 
justifies taxpayers’ indirectly subsidizing private 
startups, such as the funding of the Tech North 
project, needs a community which works as 
the collective expression of individual startups. 
As in other governance areas, the state and 
corporations need to set up, identify and support 
distinguishable local groups and mediators 
for the sake of their own legitimacy. The Tech 
Nation report works with ‘community partners’ 
and the different local businesses, and the 
initiatives that these Mancunian6 (and therefore 
local) entrepreneurs created were styled as such 
partners. The ‘community leaders’ that have 
been co-opted for the Cluster Alliance were 
among the interviewees of the Tech Nation 
report which again was similar to the statistics 
gathered by these entrepreneurs themselves. 
This was portrayed as a specific quality of the 
information as it was ‘the first community driven 
report of this scale in the UK’ (Tech City UK 
2015: 6, my italics). So the favorable growth 
numbers of ‘tech clusters’ used as justification for 
suomen antropologi  | volume 42 issue 1 spring 2017 98 
Richard Pfeilstetter
the investment in the ‘local ecosystems’ in the 
2015 UK Budget were based on the information 
of ‘tech entrepreneurs’ (UK Budget 2015: 44). 
This is what some of my informants called ‘from 
the community for the community’, or what a 
state official told me in an interview was the 
main goal of Tech North: ‘getting the ideas 
from the businesses back to the government’. 
Meanwhile, this engagement of corporations 
and the state with the local startup community 
was also producing its specific ironies. At the 
time of my fieldwork, a Tech North office space 
was being built above a multi-national bank 
funded co-workspace. The noise of the works 
made one of my informants change her office, 
‘It was so loud you couldn’t work,’ she said. 
Finally, and not less important, media-
effective investment into ‘tech-communities’ in 
the north fitted with an overarching political 
strategy of the government to enhance the 
‘northern powerhouse’. From the governance 
perspective, when the Chair of Tech City UK 
says that ‘great digital companies spring from 
collaborative communities of entrepreneurs’ 
(Tech City UK 2015: 3), she endorses the 
discourse that the ‘local community’ politics is 
about seeking to connect to the ‘global market’. 
The expansion of the Tech City program to 
Tech North and lastly Tech Nation fits into 
a more general effort by the British government 
to reengage with the country’s peripheries 
since 2014. The subsequent evolvement of 
Tech City, Tech North and Tech Nation relate 
to the socio-political stereotype of opposed, 
unequal parts (London/center vs. Manchester/
periphery), which dissolves into a synthesis 
(England/UK). Penny Harvey (1996) has 
described this phenomenon in Universal 
Exhibitions, where political unities (nation-
states) are produced through commensurable 
differences. The Tech Nation is made up of 
the sum of ‘clusters’, or territories associated 
with core technological competencies, such 
as digital media in Manchester or Fin[ancial]
Tech in Edinburgh. After all, as the Chair of 
Tech City UK recognizes, the digital sector 
is also about ‘national prestige’ (Tech City 
UK 2015: 3). Maybe it is not surprising that 
both the governmental Tech Nation report 
and the previous mapping of tech clusters 
from Manchester entrepreneurs finish with 
nearly the same wording: not only London is 
important but the whole nation. Finally, a ‘£4 
million government investment towards an 
8 floor incubator’ (UK Budget 2015: 44, my 
italics) in Manchester’s city center also fits the 
monumental place-making tradition in which 
the powerful have engaged since the 1980s 
in Manchester (see discussion in the previous 
section on the entrepreneurial city).
Summarizing, some local ‘tech community 
leaders’ in Manchester were simultaneously 
private promoters and institutional analysts of 
the evolving tech-community, key informants 
for journalists or politicians and bureaucratic 
administrators, government advisors and public 
fund receivers. Different roles were embraced 
simultaneously: the charismatic community 
organizer, the successful businessman and the 
solemn government advisor. Each role was 
structurally connected, a source of authority 
in each other’s’ field, for instance acting as 
a ‘community leader’ for the government, 
representing an archetype entrepreneur for 
young people interested in starting a business 
or representing a mediator with ‘connections to 
the government’ for corporate investors. In an 
interview, one of these leaders was defending 
classless revolutionary communitarism, doing 
things for free, teamwork and humanitarian 
values above business, ‘making as much money 
as you can’ and nationalist positions such as 
being ‘proud of that great island’. Simultaneously 
he was embracing a specific Mancunian 
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particularism, when talking about the ‘most 
rebellious city, with a healthy disrespect towards 
the establishment’. ‘What I want to represent’ 
he said ‘is an entrepreneur who thinks about 
people, the planet and profit.’ With this ‘triple 
bottom line’ my informant was paraphrasing 
John Elkington, an influential British business 
author, though to some this may sound like 
a (silicon) utopian idea aiming to reconcile 
incommensurable values. 
CONCLUSIONS: SILICON 
UTOPIAS OR CYNICISM?
One might ask if the denial of the difference 
between conflicting principles, such as profit 
(self-interest) and community (common 
interest), is a respectable utopia worth fighting 
for or a cynical strategy in business and politics, 
practiced in Manchester and elsewhere, in order 
to legitimate the underlying quest for power 
and money. Steinmüller, based on evidence from 
contemporary China, distinguishes between 
totalizing and minimal definitions of cynicism 
(2014). He sees the former as a universalistic 
moral category that holds cynical reasoning to 
be a (negative) ideological expression of our time. 
From this angle, the tech community promoters 
in Manchester could be seen as at the forefront 
of a neoliberal eclecticism that exploits values 
such as opportunism, nationalism, altruism 
or ecology as means to an end. Whereas the 
minimal definition of cynicism, more suited for 
ethnographic accounts, as Steinmüller suggests, 
is the peoples’ pragmatic distinction between 
social conventions and ‘real life’ (the underlying 
motivations of human existence, such as 
sex, money and power). Cynicism here is an 
everyday social criticism that may designate 
subordination, excuse-making or a challenge to 
prevailing moralities. Bringing this idea back 
to our case, neglecting, rejecting or suppressing 
the opposition between profit and charity, 
competition and collaboration, work and leisure 
or business and politics is a practical response 
to the multiple demands that the role of a tech 
entrepreneurship promoter entails. On the other 
hand, it might also indicate a basic ideological 
source for subcultural group cohesion of which 
the (real or imagined) opposition to ordinary 
people or mainstream society is constitutive. 
Many tech entrepreneurs are portrayed or 
portray themselves as ‘extraordinarily’ lunatic, 
innovative and creative. 
For McRobbie (2016) the whole euphoria 
about the ‘creative economy’ is part of a wider 
political project introduced in Britain at the 
turn of the century to get the new generations 
used to the idea of labor as uncertain, unstable 
and precarious. Prominent sociologists such as 
Sennett (1998) or Giddens (1991) described the 
distorting consequences for the self of the new 
flexible labor regime. More recently, the focus 
of analysis has shifted from deterritorialization 
towards surveillance as a central social outcome 
of digital technology. For instance, Frank 
Pasquale (2015) talks about an emergent 
‘Black Box Society’ where the all-embracing 
measurement of behavior (big data), processed 
by secret (privately owned) algorithms, leads to 
automated judgments in politics and business 
(see also Steiner 2012). A common thread in 
all these works is the disenchantment of digital 
technology, celebrated by governments and 
businesses alike, by uncovering its ideological 
foundations (techno optimism) and negative 
social consequences. They tend to substitute 
the silicon utopias of many technology 
entrepreneurs and state officials with academic 
dystopias. 
In this contribution, I have tried to show 
how notions such as the entrepreneurial dream 
or cynicism allow for a more nuanced analysis of 
contemporary ideologies such as the new digital 
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entrepreneurialism and their coming to (social) 
life in cities like Manchester. This is important 
because, as Clifford Geertz reminds us, ‘[w]e 
may wait as long for the “end of ideology” as the 
positivists have waited for the end of religion’ 
(1973: 199). 
NOTES
1 This research received funding from the 
University of Seville (VPPI-US I.6A; V Plan 
Propio de Investigación de la Universidad de 
Sevilla). 
2 For a literature overview of new ways of 
imagining space shaped by information and 
communication technologies see Green et al. 
(2005: 805–806).
3 Helmreich’s (1998) work, another pioneering text 
of that time on similar issues, was more specific 
in focus and outside the Bay Area, looking at 
artificial life scientists at the Santa Fe Institute, 
a private non-profit research institution in New 
Mexico.
4 According to the Oxford Dictionary, Manches-
ter can refer to household linen in South Africa, 
Australia and New Zealand. The past is portrayed 
along these lines at the city’s Museum of Science 
and Industry, as 70% of the world’s cotton textile 
production came from Manchester. There are also 
historical connections to computers and liberal-
ism (reminiscent of Borsook’s technoliberalism) 
in Manchester as the first stored-program com-
puter was invented in Manchester after World 
War Two and the Manchester School (or Man-
chesterism) in economics (different to anthro-
pology) is known for a 19th century business and 
intellectual movement advocating free trade and, 
more superficially, somewhat equivalent to laisser 
faire (see Dyer 1960).
5 Simultaneously, I would add, it is beneficial 
for the corporate identity (young, dynamic, 
innovative), and connects companies with the 
hearts and minds of their future employees. 
Invested venture capital had tax benefits for 
the companies but they had to maintain their 
connections for at least three years with the 
startup and then they would sell it off. There was 
again a market for those who would buy these 
companies after three years.
6 Demonym of Manchester.
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